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A concept of predicative inductive definability is introduced, where predicativity is 
restricted in a linguistically acceptable manner. This concept is in contrast to the monadic 
inductive definability inherent to all rewriting systems. The resulting grammars may be 
regarded as schemata for language-perception experiments; i.e., they are sets of instructions 
transforming strings where the whole process can be visualized in its entirety. 
INTRODUCTION 
Rewriting concepts of grammars used in existing formal language theory are various 
kinds of monadic inductive deiinabi1ity.l That is, in building up linguistic phenomena 
in stages, one is restricted to the concatenation of syntactical classes. 
If it is accepted that a grammar should reflect the intended interpretation of a language, 
more precisely, the intended interpretation of a sentence has to be easily read off the 
syntax analysis of this sentence, then it is not much of a surprise that the aforementioned 
concepts of grammaticality are at most good for a first rough approximation. Their 
nice parsibility properties will not make any change to this. After all, formal language 
theory should explore communication between man and machine. 
In this paper we will introduce a concept of predicative inductive definability, where 
predicativity is restricted in a linguistically acceptable manner. 
The thorough verification that this concept does what we claim, namely, that for a 
reasonably representative class of languages (proofs in intuitionistic calculi) the intended 
interpretation (recursive realization of the end formula) can easily be read off the syntac- 
tical analysis of the sentence will follow in subsequent papers. 
In this paper we merely establish a few basic facts and demonstrate the use of the con- 
cept by a few examples. Here we will not formalize “reading off a syntax analysis.” 
The examples dealt with in this paper are presumably too simple to convince an incarnate 
enthusiast of monadic inductive defmablity. After a moment of thought about the 
aforementioned verification, he certainly will spare me lengthy discussions about predi- 
cate calculus versus propositional calculus. The more so since the linguistic restrictions 
are easily understood. 
One of the things which did strike me over the years is the fact that the concepts 
of monadic inductive definability useful in practice (e.g. context-free or regular grammars) 
’ Except for minor enhancements by so called parallel rewriting. 
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do have the remarkable property that the depth of induction is linearly bounded by the 
length of the words generated or accepted. I was rather pleased to see that the newly 
introduced concept has the same property, mainly since it was felt that if nothing else 
the depth of induction is a significant measure of complexity. Thinking of man rather 
than of machine, one could-loosely speaking-call it the hypothesis of real time 
perceptibility of language. After all, man is not a bottleneck machine. 
1. MOTIVATION AND DEFINITION OF ELEMENTARY LINGUISTIC INDUCTION 
Let us consider a context-free production rule rr: S’s + S,S, *.. S, where S, ,..., S,, 
are nonterminals. Z- expresses that a string x E V*r (Vr : terminal alphabet) belongs to 
the syntactical class S, provided there are substrings xi ,..., X, of x such that 
x = xxx2 “‘X, A XIESl A *.. A X,ES,, 
i.e.,. 
7-J.: (3x1 v.e.3 %)PART2 (x = x1x2 “‘X, A x1 E s, A ... A X,ES,)+XESg. 
Looking at the above rephrasing of the context-free production r, one realizes that the 
restriction to monadic constructs (xi E SC) for the building up of linguistic phenomena 
(x E S,,) is hardly more than a notational caprice of the handy rewriting notation. 
In other words, I could not think of any reason for rejecting a rule like 
5-r’: (3x, ,**‘, Xn)P*RT2 (x = x1x2 -*x,hXIESlh ...Ax,ES,AR~~,~~)-~~ES~ 
where R is a “linguistic” relation (e.g., explicitly defined like PARTWORD, =, #, etc., 
or an inductively defined one). 
In formalizing this idea we have to overcome one obstacle, which is not due to the 
newly introduced relations but due to the fact that we want the intended interpretation 
to be easily read off the syntax analysis. It is this fact which makes us reject a rule like 
I.e., we will permit inductively defined phenomena (classes, relations) to influence in 
a positive sense only the building up of “new” linguistic phenomena (St,). (We could 
remove this restriction if the complements of linguistic phenomena are also linguistic 
phenomena.) In rewriting concepts this positve influence is automatically built in; 
which might explain their popularity; even so the price paid for it is definitely too high. 
In the following we will first deal with the building up of a single phenomenon. That is, 
e.g., in the considered production w’: Si is either explicitly defined or equal to S, and R 
is explicitly defined. In this case ~7’ has the form @(x, S,,) -+ x E S,, , expressing that S, 
is a fixed point (actually the minimal fixed point built up from the empty set) of the 
mapping: 
r, : Power( V*,) + Power( V*,) defined by x E r@(S) t) @(x, S). 
402 P. F. SCHULER 
The most general way we could take into account the aforementioned positve influence 
of S is by asking r, to be monotone, i.e., Ii C V -+ T,(U) C F,(V). 
In our definition of linguistically meaningful Q’s given below (Definition 4), we will 
not make use of this generality merely because our intended use (reading off the syntax 
analysis the intended interpretation for the case of recursive realizations of intuitionistic 
calculi) can do without it. In other words a straightforward syntactic description of the 
class of the “meaningful” Q’s, such that each member of this class is automatically 
monotone, is given. 
Afterwards a simple Lemma on simultaneous induction will offer us the same con- 
veniences of making use of a multitude of auxiliary linguistic constructs, very much in 
the way we are used to it from, e.g., context-free grammars. Now let us first introduce 
some convenient notions. 
DEFINITION 1. A litguistic structure LS is an abstract structure (V*, RI ,..., R, ,...) 
where V is a finite alphabet, V* is the set of all finite words over V, and R, ,..., R, are 
A,-ary linguistic relations* (together with concatenation not explicitly mentioned) 
DEFINITION 2. A monotone operator r on a linguistic structure LS is a mapping: 
Power(( V*)“) -+ Power(( V*)“) such that: 
(a) (VX, Y)(XC Y -+ r(X) C r(Y)) where _C is the set inclusion. 
To any ordinal 5 we define Lr 6 = r((J,<cL,n) and L>c = UeCCL,n, i.e., L/ = I’(L>E) 
and Lr = (JE L/z the relation inductively defined by r (built up by r). The closure ordinal 
1 l’ 1 of r is the least 6 such that L, = L,E (= L:‘). 
EXAMPLE 1. r, defined by: x E I’,(S) t)df @r(x, S) where 
@1(x, 9: PY, 4PdY E v A x = zy A z E S) is obviously monotone, where 
Px indicates that y, z have to be partwords of x. 
G, : all words up to length m over V and 1 r, 1 = w and LrI = V*. 
EXAMPLE 2. Let Rx, y be the following context-sensitive well ordering of type 
2woverV={a,,a,,...,a,}n> 1: 
a0 , aoao , woao ,. .., a, , ala, , alala ,.-, 
r, defined by: x E r,(S) f-) @a(~, S) where 
@24x, 8): (VY’y)(RY, x + y E S) is obviously monotone. 
(bl) For K > 0: (ao)b E r,(S) +-+ {a, ,..., (ao)k-l} C S. 
(b2) For K > 0: (al)” E I’,(S) +-+ {a, ,..., (a#+‘> C S A {a,>* C S. 
* For the time being it is of no significance what they are. The reader should think of them as 
linguistic primitives. 
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From (b2) we see that there will be no uniform effective method to go from any recur- 
sively intelligible description of S to such a description of I’,(S). 
(c) For any natural number m 
G* = @,I*, 
L y.l” = {uo}* u {a, ,...) q”}. 
EXAMPLE 3. Let Rx, y be as in Example 2: 
rs defined by: x E r,(S) ++ @s(x, S) where 
@s(x, S): (‘v’y),,(Ry, x + y c S) is obviously monotone 
]rsj =wandLr 2 = Lrs and for any natural number m: 
LY* = ij {aok} u ij {u,“}. 
k=O k=O 
Let S denote a unary predicate (variable); then as defined in [4, Sect. 51 (S//{c})” denotes 
the relation 
(s//{d)kx, yl ,..., yk+l , yl ,...,yk G x = wlr2 *-' ykYkyk+l h 'lyZ '-' yk+lE se 
For notational convenience we shall write (S)k in place of (S//(e))” which should not be 
confused with the k-split (S), of [4] ((S)O = S). 
The reader familiar with inductions will already have realized what our intention is; 
namely, to prepare a careful step beyond inductions along the well-founded relation 
PARTx, y (see Example 3). In other words, we will allow (in inductive definitions) 
regress not only on partwords but also on words which are constructively constituted 
from such words in the above indicated way; i.e., they are formed by extraction of part- 
words yi . 
To any linguistic structure LS = (V*, RI ,..., R,) we define the language ZLs to 
be the set of well-formed formulas @ of the lower predicate calculus with further 
restrictions: 
(a) Simple terms: individual variables and words over V. 
(b) Terms: defined as usual with the only operation-constant 0 for concatenation 
in V*. 
(c) Relation constants: RI ,..., R, and Cx, y, z: concatenation as ternary relation, 
=, PART. 
(d) n-ary relation variables: S, T,... together with (S)kl*****kn..., etc. 
(e) All quantifications in @ are on individual variables and , are S-bounded 
W1pz y (VY~ *-* see [31). 
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The language LZLs is adequate to express elementary linguistic facts. It corresponds 
to weak-context-sensitivy without context-free basis (see [3]). 
DEFINITION 3. For @p(S) E $PLs we define S occurs positively in @5(S) inductively 
as follows: 
(a) S and (S)k for arbitrary k does not occur in @. 
(b) S is n-ary and t, ,..., t, are terms and @ is St, ,..., t, (notation: i E S), respec- 
tively, CD is Skl*...,k41 ,..., t’, where r = 2 x C (K, + 1) (notation t’ E (S)“). 
(c) If S is positive in Q1 , @s then also in @r v Q2 , @i A Qp, , (3~)~~ @i , (VyIpz @i . 
DEFINITION 4. A formula @(z, U) is elementary linguistic in R, ,..., R, iff 
(a) U is the only relation variable of @ and each occurrence of U and (U)E for 
arbitrary K = (kr ,..., k,) where n = degree of U is positive. 
(b) All arguments of U and (U)’ in @ are simple terms. 
(c) All occurrences of RI ,..., R, in @ are positive. 
An operator l? Power((V*)‘+) -+ Power((V*)n) is elementary linguistic in R, ,..., R, 
iff there exists an elementary linguistic formula @(x, II) such that: 
(d) All free individual variables of @(%, U) are among f = (x1 ,..., x,). 
(e) a(%, U) strongly defines r, i.e., 
Remark. The reader familiar with W.C.S. reducibilities notices 
r(L) <L join R, join *.* join R, . 
3 
In the following we assume for notational convenience, degree (r) = 1. 
THEOREM 1. For any elementary linguistic operator r the following hold: 
(1) r is monotone. 
(2) r is continuous and 1 r 1 < W, i.e., 
oww~)(~ E r(s) ++ x E w,)) 
where 
where <olex denotes the lexicographical ordering. 
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Proof. By easy inductions over the “length” of the defining elementary linguistic 
formulas. Q.E.D. 
DEFINITION 5. An q-ary relation L (over V*) is definable by elementary linguistic induc- 
tion in R, ,..., R, iff there exists an elementary linguistic operatorI? Power((V*)“+*) --f 
Power((V*(“+q) in RI ,..., R, such that 
there exists ;i = (71~ ,..., r],J E ( V*)lc with fe L t) (z, ;i) EL, 
and we call +j parameters of the induction. 
An important part of the significance of inductive definability is illustrated by the next 
example: 
EXAMPLE 4. As often happens in mathematics the introduction of inductive 
definability does enable us to use parts of 9 Ls to define, e.g., sets by linguistic closure 
properties without the usual engagement of second order arguments, as might be 
illustrated by: 
Let V = {a, , a, ,..., a,}, n > 2, 
qx, H): x = a, v x = a, v (3y, z)pz (x = yz A y E H A z E (a, , al}). 
The free submonoid {a, , ur}* C V* is then defined either by 
(a) second order explicit definition expressing that {a, , ur}* is contained in every 
set H which is closed under suffixing a, or a, , i.e., 
x E {a,, q}* ++ (VH){(Vw)(@(w, H) - w E H) + 3 E HI, 
or the more constructive 
(b) inductive definition 
x E {a, , al}* t) x EL, t) qx, L,) 4-+ di 
t n=O @9- 
x, fi L 
Let G = ({a, ,..., a,), {I}, {I + la, , I -+ la, , I + a, , I -+ a,}, I) be a context-free 
grammar generating {a, , ul} *. We therefore realize that @(x, L,) expresses elegantly 
nothing else but x EL(G) (= L,) is and only if there exists a finite derivation of x in G. 
EXAMPLE 5. Happily we are now in a position to handle the most annoying open 
problem of [3], namely: 
and i1 ,..., i, permutation of l,..., n> 
406 P. F. SCHULER 
is definable by elementary linguistic induction (in m ) by 
A [{x = “t G t”} v {x = “t + 2 Z t + w” A “Z FE v” E S} 
v {x = ‘2 + z SE et + t” A “Z SE 0” E S} 
v {x = “t + z zzz w + t + w” A “2 E w + 2)” E S}]).” 
A comparison of @(x, S) with any definition of L, in elementary formal systems shows 
that @ is among the best definition of L, possible: Best with regard to transparency, 
strutural information, elegance, and last but not least with respect to parsing-it clearly 
tells what has to be done without choosing an algorithm doing so. 
EXAMPLE 6. Multiplication in unary representation is definable by elementary 
linguistic induction: 
Let V = {a}; then 
Mx,y,xe,x=am, y=an, and z=am*n for some m, n E N; 
@((X, ‘J’, X),L): (~X’)pz(~y’)p~(y = Y’U A Z = X’X A (X, y’, Z’) EL); 
clearly L, = M. 
EXAMPLE 7. (a) @r(x, S): (VyyIP2(y E S): Lo1 = ~5 and any initial segment T of 
the word tree is a fixed point of r, defined by C& , 
c&(x, S): (Vy)p,(y = x v y E S):L, = I/*. 
(b) Let RI be a context-sensitive language; R*, is definable by elementary linguistic 
induction in R, : 
@(x, S): x E RI v (3y, z),& = yz A y E S A z E R,). 
EXAMPLE 8. Inductive definition of reasoning: Let the primitives of our linguistic 
structure be A C I”*= the set of hypothesis accepted (axioms) R, ,..., R, of degree 
4 + 1Y.V l-2, + 1 over V*, : the rules of conversational consequence (inference). The 
set of accepted reasonings (proofs) is inductively defined by 
* More accurately (S)* x, C, .z=, o, tf, t+ (definition, Example 3) etc. 
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where the weak-context-sensitive definitions of sequences (x1 ,...,) and E are given in [3]. 
This definition compares faborably with the usual explicit definitions. 
DEFINITION 6. A relation L is linguistically hyperelementary in RI ,..., R, iff both 
L and E (complement) are definable by elementary linguistic induction in R, ,..., R, . 
2. BASIC PROPERTIES OF ELEMENTARY LINGUISTIC INDUCTIONS 
Although we could not find a single example of a language defined by elementary 
linguistic induction, which is not context sensitive, we could not establish this to be true 
in general. The major obstacle will become evident in the proof of Theorem2(a). I did 
not pursue the matter any further, mainly because I am not too sure about the significance 
of general context sensitivity anymore. The rewards for doing so would essentially be 
[4] and [5] for linguistic inductive definability in place of weak-context-sensitivity. 
THEOREM 2. For any elementary linguistic formula @(x, S) where degree (S) = 1, 
the following hold: 
(a) There exists a deterministic Turing machine 2X, deciding 
x E LQ with storage amount < c * length(x) * log(Zqth(x)) for some c. 
(b) x EL, +-+ x E L;length@) for some c, i.e., the depth of induction is linear bounded. 
Proof. Easy but tedious. Only the essentials of the proof will be outlined. The 
T machine ‘&, is obtained by the following generalization of the parser for W.C.S. languages 
defined in the proof of Theorem 4 in [3]. 
Again all partword configurations f1 ,..., t,, to evaluate @([, L,) are enumerated with 
the help of a bracket structure on 5 adequate for @. 
But whereas in [3] only disjunctions of conjunctions of atoms and negated atoms 
(concatenation, context-free sets) had to be evaluated now additionally we have to 
evaluate fim EL, for certain tik where PART fik , ,$ A Eil, # 6: But this can be performed 
by the introduction of a new bracket structure for @ on [a which has to be marked such 
that it cannot be confused with already existing bracket structures. Since we can evaluate 
one tik EL, after another at any instance at most length(x) different bracket structures 
have to be engaged, which yields (a). 
(b) It is obvious that any occurrence of x E S in @(x, S) can be “cancelled” from 
@(x, S) without changing the fixpoint of @. More formally this is established by an easy 
induction on the length of @ (empty formula defines the empty set), which yields (b) 
(with c determined by the constants in 0). Q.E.D. 
Open problem. Does (a) hold for ‘%@ linear bounded. 
4 Or tik constituted from such words and length ([J < length([) for (S)k. 
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The following theorems and lemmas are easily understood on intuitive grounds. The 
formal proofs are made because of their fundamental role. The less interested reader 
is advised to read the proofs diagonally. 
THEOREM 3 (transitivity). Let L, be definable by elementary linguistic induction in 
R Ii,: 1 ,***, 
L, de$nable by e.1. induction in L, , RI ,..., R, ; then 
L, definable by e.1. induction in R, ,..., R, . 
Proof. The main obstacle we have to overcome arises from the fact that in the defining 
formula 
@2(x, S, L, 3 RI ,...> Q for L, in L, , RI ,..., R, 
composed questions t, 0 t, 0 ... 0 t, EL, (occurring positvely in @a) where tl ,... , t, are 
simple terms may occur. But we observe that if ti is a variable then it is S-bounded by 
x or ti = x. 
LEMMA 1. If L, is dejinable by elementary linguistic induction in R, ,..., R, then for 
any natural number k the k-split (LJk : 
is also de$nable by elementary linguistic induction in R, ,..,, R, . 
Proof of lemma. The proof is straightforward and easy. All essential points of it 
are outlined by the following informal sketch of the proof. 
Let @,(x, S, R, ,..., R,) denote an elementary linguistic formula for the inductive 
definition of L, . 
If we replace all parts y E S of Or (and analogously 2~ (S)‘) by (yr ,..., yk) E S and 
all further occurrences of y by yr 0 ya 0 .*a 0 yk together with the obvious alterations of 
the kind: 
@Y)P3 bY (3Yl)PZ, ... (3y,),,,(PARTy, o ... oyk , x1 o x2 o *.a o xk A Y) 
we obtain an elementary linguistic formula: 
Pl(z, S, R, ,..., R,) defining inductively (L& . 
Q.E.D. (Lemma) 
Let L, be the minimal fixpoint of @a( y, T, L, , RI ,..., R,) and k the maximal split on 
L, needed to get rid of all composed questions concerning L, in @a . 
Let (L& be built up by @‘r(~, 7, S, R1 ,..., R,) where S is a k + I-ary relation symbol, 
i.e., 
(Viqx E (L,)* t) (Z, n> E Lq*) for some c%E (V*). 
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Let @‘a(~, S, T, RR, ,..., R,) be obtained from @a by replacing the composed questions 
concerning L, by simple questions concerning (L,), and T substituted for (L& . 
We shall show that there is an elementary formula @(y, Z, $ t, S, RI ,..., R,) such that 
for some wO # wr E I/* and 4 E (V*)“, 71 E I’*, % E (V*)l: 
holds, which will prove Theorem 3. 
Let S denote an I + k + 2-ary relation symbol. In the following we shall omit the 
writing of RI ,..., R, if possible. 
@(y, 5, z, t, S): 
[t = w. A @‘l(z, 2, (<Lz, z’) 1 (7, f’, 2, wo) E S))] 
v [t = Wl A @‘2(Y, {y’ I (y’, $7 %, WI> 6 s>, {x’ ! (7, g’, a, wo> E S))] 
where the use of, e.g., {(x’, z’) / (7, - x’, z’, wa) E S} is an unambiguous denotation for 
the notational changes to be made in @‘, , etc. 
(a) Proof by induction on p. 
Induction hypothesis: 
(7, iiT, a, wo) E Lg t--t (3, ii) EL%; , 
(ind. hyp.): t) @(T, Z, 2, w, , ((7, X, a, wo) 1 (a a) ELM,}), 
(def of @): t) @r’(%, 2, L;f) t) (%, a) EL!&< . 
(b) The proof is slightly more complicated since if L,p denotes L~g,ty,s,fL J R R ) 1 k. 1....* n 
then 
(1) (y, 5, 5, wi) EL& -y E&O, i.e., [LfJ,~,~,w,ll CLg will hold. 
But for the reverse only 
(2) y E L,o -+ (y, l, [, wi) E Lo will be true since to decide y EL, we have to 
answer “composed” questions ti o t, o 1.. 0 tk so we must wait until a stage p of induction 
such that <tl ,..., t, , a) EL&. or (tl ,..., t, , a) E LQ1, (complement). 
(That of course is essentially the price we pay for not having established a corre- 
spondence between stages of induction for L, and (L,), .) 
410 P. F. SCHULER 
(1) Induction hypotheses: [L$&J, CL.?: 
(Y, E> 59 Wl> EL0 
- - 
-WY, 895, WlJ2). 
(def @): 
(monotonicity): 
--+ %‘(Y, {Y’ I <Y’, 5, %, Wl> 4% (Ll)k). 
(ind. hyp + monot): 
- @z’(Y, L?, (U) -+ y EL,“. 
(2) Induction hypothesis: y’ E Lp + (y’, ,f, %, wl) EL, : 
Y ELzD 
* @z’(Y, JF> &hc). 
(ind. hyp + monot): 
- %‘(Y, {Y’ I (Y’, t, c Wl> EL@), (Ll),). 
(4: 
+ %‘(Y, {Y’ I (Y’, ‘5 5, Wl> E-w, 1%’ I (7, F’T 4 wo> ~JkTJ). 
(def CD): 
-@(y, 8, t=, "l,LD) + (Y, f, 5, Wl> EL@. Q.E.D. 
The reader familiar with the “set-polynomial” representations of context-free 
grammars, will have no problems with the following definition: 
DEFINITION 7. Two sets (relations) L, , L, are dejinable by simultaneous elementary 
linguistic induction in R, ,..., R, iff there exist two elementary linguistic formulas 
@I(% S, T, & >..., R,), @,(x S, T, R, ,...> R,) (all occurrences of S, T, RI ,..., R, posi- 
tive and all arguments of S, (S)k, T, (T)’ simple) such that for L,‘, L,” defined by 
x EL,’ t-) @&z, L:‘, L;“, R, ,..., R,), 
7 EL,’ H Q2( 7, L:‘, L:‘, R, ,..., R,), 
L,’ converges to L, and L,’ converges to L, . 
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LEMMA 2.s If L, , L, are dejnable by simultaneous elementary linguistic induction in 
R 1 ,***, RR, then L, andL, are both definable by elementary induction in R, ,..., R, . 
Proof. Let w,, # w, E V* and 4 E ( V*)k where K = degree(L,) and ?j E (Y*)r where 
I  q = degree (L.J, 
where @i , G2 are as in Definition 7. 
It is easy to establish by induction 
and 
fEL1t, (S, ij, wo) EL@ 
r~L~+d,.$w1>&. Q.E.D. 
COROLLARY. Context-free and weakly context-sensitive sets are de&able by elementary 
linguistic induction. 
The following theorem establishes some links with existing formal language theory. 
THEOREM 4 (closure properties 2). (a) The family of languages definable by elemen- 
tary linguistic induction in R, ,..., R, is closed under union, intersection, explicit trans- 
formation, concatenation, concatenation-closure, bounded quantification. 
(b) For n = 0 this family is also closed under <-free homomorphism with suffix property. 
Proof. (a) Obvious by Theorem 3. 
(b) In contrast to (a) h(L) is in general not definable by elementary linguistic 
induction in L (h: e-free homomorphism with suffix property). 
But obviously we can simulate any induction in the homomorphic image h( V*) 
(observing that h( V*) is definable by elementary linguistic induction). Q.E.D. 
Remark. The failure of the above mentioned family of languages to be closed under 
various common substitutions could be overcome by a “minor” generalization, namely, 
by allowing [S//OJ” [4, p. 3661 in place of (S)k (= [S//(C)]“) to occur in elementary 
linguistic formulas. But the reader familiar with, e.g., post-systems in normal form will 
realize that this is a dangerous step (leading back to recursive enumerability) unless 
(very technical) restrictions, e.g., concerning length of inserted words, are imposed. 
Concluding remark. As any compiler writer knows, the easy part of a compiler is the 
parser whereas producing good code (i.e., reading off the syntax-analysis the intended 
5 This Lemma shows that in defining languages by elementary linguistic induction we can make 
use of auxiliary syntactic classes exactly the same way as we can in defining, e.g., context-free 
languages. In other words we could have made Definition 7 the starting point for the new concept 
of grammars. Lemma 2 would then represent a central aid for assessing its expressive power. 
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interpretation) is essentially more difficult6 (and so far hardly dealt with in formal language 
theory). He certainly accepts that a formal language theory not ignoring the later difficult 
part is in need for more subtle concepts of grammaticality. 
Unless one thinks communications to be essentially less subtle than, e.g., numerical 
mathematics, one can hardly expect such a formal language theory to come up with a 
uniform effective method (compiler-compiler) to deal with all communications. The most 
we can reasonably expect is: tools to thoroughly define communication (all of it) and tools 
for a thorough investigation of their costs (complexity). To give a concrete example: 
Looking, e.g., at a complete (weakly context-sensitive) definition of Algol 60 (see [3]), 
we easily pin down a set of Skolem functions, whose computational complexity essentially 
determines the “costs” of Algol 60 (p arsing only). The more so since evidence for the 
existence of communication theory is sparse (e.g., explicit definability, for the abbreviation 
of complex facts, without which a language is practically useless) and experience (mainly 
formal languages of mathematical logic) to base a foundational analysis upon is relatively 
young and unknown. 
REFERENCES 
1. Y. N. MOSCHOVAKIS, Elementary induction on abstract structures, in “Studies in Logic and the 
Foundations of Mathematics,” Vol. 77, North-Holland, Amsterdam/London, 1974. 
2. J. E. FENSTAD AND P. G. HINMAN, Generalized recursion theory, in “Studies in Logic and the 
Foundations of Mathematics,” Vol. 79, North-Holland, Amsterdam/London, 1974. 
3. P. F. SCHULER, Weakly context-sensitive languages as model for programming languages, Acta 
l?zfcwmaticu 3 (1974), 155-170. 
4. P. F. SCHULER, WCS analysis of the context-sensitive, Actu Informatica 5 (1975), 369-371. 
5. P. F. SCHULER, Note on degrees of contex-sensitivity, Acta Informutica 5 (1975), 387-394. 
6. C. G. JOCKUSCH, JR., Semirecursive sets and positive reducibility, Trans. Amer. Math. Sot. 131 
(1968), 420-436. 
7. S. C. KLEENE, The foundations of intuitionistic mathematics especially in relation to recursive 
functions, in “Studies in Logic and the Foundations of Mathematics,” North-Holland, 
Amsterdam/London, 1965. 
8. D. E. KNUTH, Semantics of context-free languages. Math. Systems Theory 2 (1968), 127-145. 
B For instance, Query-Compiler with the intended interpretation: good search algorithm 
